Listening for a Sound That Won't Be There                                Once upon a                time we fought a war in Southeast Asia, a war we pretty much lost,                no matter what Nixon said. Let's not get into the whole set of lies                and half-truths that got us into that war. Nor the lies that kept                us there or the lives thrown away and the patriotism squandered.                All on an unwinnable war far from our shores whose end result was                a peace that we could have had thirty years before. I mention the                war only to provide context for a small glimpse into how we                fought that war in the intelligence arena and why so much of today                looks so very, very familiar to me. 
I was drafted                in September of 1965, one of the 50 thousand that Johnson requested                to escalate the war in Vietnam. I didn't have any strong feelings                one way or another about the war. I wanted to believe that we were                doing something good and noble over there. Call me naïve, I                probably was. I grew up reading about World War Two and watched                Korea unfold on the screens of the local movie houses in the newsreels                – I'm of the last generation so privileged. I felt it was my                duty to serve my country when asked. I admired the writing of Robert                Heinlein and found the premise of granting suffrage only to veterans                that he put forth in Starship                Troopers to make some degree of sense. 
When I went                down for my induction, I opted to enlist, choosing the Army Security                Agency as my branch. I made this choice because my cousin had been                in the ASA and several of my other friends had served either in                that branch or in the Air Force equivalent. I had a facility for                language and was fascinated with the world of intelligence. Blame                Ian                Fleming and Graham                Greene for that. I tested well, too well in fact to be trained                in any of the languages I really wanted like German (which I'd studied                along with Spanish in High School) Russian, Czech, Hungarian and                so forth. I scored in the top one percent on the Army Language Aptitude                Test, the ALAT. I was doomed to be sent to learn an Asian language.                Even that might have been alright. Chinese, Korean, Japanese  –                 Japanese, especially since I liked the culture and had some family                history in the area. But no. The Army had other ideas. 
I was selected                to be trained as a Lao linguist and area analyst. I spent thirty-nine                weeks in the Foreign Service Institute  –  or rather in a contract                class taught in some anonymous high-rise in Alexandria, VA  –  on                civilian status learning the language of Laos, a language spoken                by only about six million people. I did reasonably well, spending                six hours in class each day and an additional two to four in the                language lab working with tapes. My classmates and I spoke Lao among                ourselves, sitting in bars and clubs in the District and being enigmatic. 
I went up to                Ft. Meade, assigned to the ASA unit located just outside the grounds                of the NSA headquarters known as the Puzzle Palace, America's codebreakers.                America's eavesdroppers, phone tappers, cable interceptors. It's                called Signal Intelligence  –  SigInt  –  and it was considered a                very important part of our defense against the great enemy against                whom we were struggling, World Communism. I learned my trade there                under a very informal Navy Chief Petty Officer who insisted we all                call him "Bob." It was anything but glamorous, but you knew that,                right? Intelligence is mostly a lot of drudgery unless you're a                field agent and even then there's more paperwork than anything else.                For that matter, that's true of a lot of jobs that people who don't                do them consider exciting and glamorous. Like being a cop. I've                done that, too, for that matter. 
While I was                at NSA, assigned to the Southeast Asia desk, clipping newspaper                articles that mentioned my unit's target, the Lao Neutralist Army                of Kong Le, there was a major flap in the Royal Lao Air Force. I                was at my desk, going through the day's papers when I came across                a front-page story about an attempted coup in Laos. At dawn of 22                October 1966, under the command of General Thao Ma, commander of                the Tactical Air Force, eight RLAF T-28s set out to strike different                targets in Vientiane. I was about to call my boss when some of the                upstairs brass strode into the area demanding to know why they had                to learn about something like this in the morning's paper.  
Since it was                my desk they seemed to be gathering at, I attempted to answer. I                said that, in all probability the coup attempt – Ma's second                in a little over a year – had been a closely held operation                with radio silence maintained. Since we had no real assets on the                ground and no penetration of the Lao military, there was no way                for us to know until it was fait accompli. They wanted to know how                a Reuter’s correspondent had gotten the story so quickly and I told                him that he was probably standing around the air field when the                planes took off from Luang Prabang where he and his most loyal                pilots had essentially been exiled. He'd seen the direction of flight                – toward Vientiane, not Vietnam – and followed up. "How                did he get this information and how could he follow up so quickly?"                they asked. "Well," I replied, "they probably pay him a pretty                good bonus for scoops like this." They were not amused.  
People were                not all that amused with General Ma, either. His sortie attacked                two ammunition depots and the main command of the armed forces along                with the homes of several Generals. Thirty-six people died on the                ground and dozens more were wounded. Then the American and British                Ambassadors interfered and forced the general to give up. He and                12 of his pilots then fled to Thailand, where – after several                months in prison – all were granted political asylum. The T-28s                were repainted with the Royal Thai Air Force markings and flew missions                in support of various secret wars in the area. 
Now, the relevance                of this to the present situation is this: We have come to rely heavily                on technology. We can eavesdrop on just about anyone, anywhere at                any time. We have super computers and thousands of specialists in                a variety of fields who can take any piece of Electronic Intelligence                and process it, mine it for every bit of information and then make                pretty good guesses as to what it means. But the best way to foil                us is to use low tech. Meet face to face. Plan the operation before                you start, meeting in small cells with little chance of penetration                and then carrying out the mission with no further discussion outside                that cell. No phone calls, no radio transmission, no email, nothing                that requires technology or lends itself easily to technological                interception. 
The concern                currently over the illegal use of no-warrant intercepts of domestic                conversations is certainly valid, but it's not the first time we've                done something like this. In theory, NSA must have a warrant. Of                course, the CIA isn't supposed to operate domestically either, but                they do. The practical ex-spook, ex-cop some days yearns for the                freedom to use any means necessary to do the job. There's been an                internal struggle for years with the two sides of my personality                and the civil libertarian always wins, damn his eyes. In my opinion,                no amount of wiretaps, radio intercepts, fancy programs to sift                among the millions of transmissions of all kinds, analog, digital                or any combination legal or illegal will prevent or even warn us                of the next terrorist attack if they are following good practice.                That's the really sad part. And it makes you wonder  –  it certainly                makes me wonder  –  if the Bush administration knows that. I think                they do and that means that all of this is a ploy to be able to                control the American people. And that's not how it is supposed to                be. Well, I told you I was naïve. 
 
February                14, 2006 Jamie                Fraser-Paige [send him mail]                is a former member of the Army Security Agency, shorn of his Top                Secret Crypto clearance for his political unreliability. He nonetheless                served in the US Army honorably from 1965 to 1969 as a non-com.                He is also a former police officer and security consultant who lives                with his lady, a chef and their cat in the San Francisco Bay area.                Since 1984 he has voted Libertarian and done volunteer work                for the party. In 1985 he wrote the California party flyer on the                Second Amendment and ran for a seat on the Berkeley City Council. Copyright                © 2006 LewRockwell.com                                 |          
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